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4introduction: mining in KyrgyzStan
Although the mining industry may be small in 
comparison with other sectors when measured 
in economic terms, it is nonetheless central to 
the global economy and increasingly impor-
tant to a number of countries that host the 
mining industry. In the Central Asian state of 
Kyrgyzstan, agriculture continues to dominate 
the economy as a whole. However, the share 
of the mining industry of the country GDP 
has increased from 5 per cent in 2005 to rep-
resent 12 per cent of GDP, 39 per cent of the 
value of all industrial output, 40 per cent of 
total exports by volume, and 12 per cent of tax 
revenues in 2010.² Despite changing figures, 
it could be said that the mining industry has 
always played a crucial role in the economic 
and social development of the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic. Currently, the mining industry is recog-
nizably the basis of industrial production of 
Kyrgyzstan.³ The mining sector employs an 
estimated 15 000 workers.⁴
 The Kyrgyz Republic as part of the former 
Soviet Union had a relatively developed min-
ing industry that employed up to 50 000 peo-
ple. In various periods during the Soviet era, 
the share of Kyrgyzstan in the total produc-
tion of mineral products was 15–18 per cent 
for lead, 40–100 per cent for mercury, 100 per 
cent for antimony, up to 30 per cent for rare 
earth metals, and up to 15 per cent for urani-
um. State financing of mineral exploration and 
prospecting totalled 50 million rubles a year. 
As a  result, a powerful geological infrastruc-
ture was established in the country.⁵
 By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion, mass investments had resulted in the dis-
covery of several thousands of objects classified 
as deposits or manifestations of minerals regis-
tered by the State Cadastre. Among them, there 
are deposits discovered and fully prepared for 
exploitation such as Kumtor (a world-class 
gold deposit of 12 million ounces), Jerooy and 
Taldy-Bulak Levoberezhnyi (two medium-size 
reserves of gold deposits of 3 million ounces 
each), and at least a dozen deposits with the 
reserves of 1 million ounces of gold.
 Overall, Kyrgyzstan can be considered rich 
in mineral resources. The minerals known here 
include molybdenum, iron ore, aluminum raw 
material, tin, mercury, rare earth metals and 
gold.6 Gold has been the main mineral sector 
in Kyrgyzstan since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Currently, gold constitutes 90 per cent 
of the national mining production by volume 
and is the main export of Kyrgyzstan.⁷
 The country’s mineral resources being fair-
ly rich, mining activities have become larger 
and more serious in recent years. Important 
contributing factors to this development have 
been the improved business environment and 
mainly the global trend of increasing prices of 
raw materials traditional for Kyrgyzstan. 
 In 2011, the deposits of Ishtamberdy, 
Dzhamgyr and Karakazyk with the total gold 
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5reserves of 22 tons have been put into opera-
tion. In 2012, construction of mines should 
be completed at the deposits of Bozymchak, 
 Nasonovskoye and Kumbel with the reserves of 
gold totaling 30.9 tons and of copper 1 517 000 
tons. The deposits of Aidarbek and Chonky-
mysdykty, with the reserves of gold compris-
ing 25.1 tons and of copper 705 000 tons, are 
expected to be put in operation in 2013. In ad-
dition, a number of deposits are planned to be 
put into operation in 2014: tin and tungsten 
deposits of Trudovoye, Uchkoshkon and Kensu 
with the reserves of tin totalling 205 000 and 
124 000 tons respectively; the gold deposits 
of Jerooy, Taldybulak Levoberezhnyi, Kuru-
Tegerek, Shambesay, Unkrurtash and Chaarat 
with gold reserves of 234 tons. Currently, these 
deposits are at the planning and construction 
stage (Taldybuldak Levoberezhnyi), final pros-
pecting stage (Unkurtash, Chaarat), feasibility 
study stage (Shambesay) and at the stage of 
preparation of technical projects for the devel-
opment (Kuru-Tegerek).⁸
Introduction: Mining in Kyrgystan
6The development of Kyrgyz mining policy has 
moved from one challenge to another. During 
the Soviet era, policy-making was rather simple 
thanks to the highly centralized and state-led 
management system of natural resources ex-
traction. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the Kyrgyz mining sector experienced a severe 
decline. The run-down situation was linked to 
the transition from a centrally planned system 
to a market economy. The newly independent 
Kyrgyz Republic had to survive without higher-
level control, support and direction, with its 
weak and undeveloped state institutions and 
an inadequate administrative system.9
 In the new situation, government policy, 
and especially taxation, was to play an im-
portant role in the development of the Kyrgyz 
mining sector. The starting point was not very 
promising since many foreign investors had 
backed away from the country due to their 
removed privileges. The withdrawal of inves-
tors combined with decreased world prices 
for the metals produced by the country forced 
the government to take new action to improve 
the situation.¹0 Consequently, the government 
has over the years taken on several measures 
including reduction of royalty rates, simplifica-
tion of the licensing procedure, a cutback in the 
state share of mining projects, transformation 
of regulatory acts to reduce state interference 
in the industry, introduction of a new clause on 
taxing into the Tax Code on the use of subsoil, 
and establishment of an agency responsible for 
managing the mining and minerals industry.¹¹ 
 At the end of the first decade of the twenty 
first century, the future of private investments 
in the Kyrgyz mining sector seemed optimistic 
and further growth of exploration investments 
was expected. However, although the state 
was committed to continue the legal reform 
vital to improve the operational conditions 
for mining, the financial risks were to shift to 
private investors.¹² Privatization is naturally a 
part of the transformation to a liberal market 
economy, but expectations for foreign inves-
tors might be unrealistic. There is no guaran-
tee that the gained profits of the industry will, 
directly or indirectly benefit Kyrgyz citizens or 
lead up to any acceleration in the development 
of the country. Extensive administrative con-
trol over the mining industry is another factor 
in the picture.¹³ It has been the government 
line that the shift from administrative and le-
gal management to civil regulation has to be 
gradual.¹⁴
 It is clear that Kyrgyzstan has recognized 
the potential of its mining industry and has 
made an effort to develop its operational en-
vironment. However, during the last decade, 
Kyrgyzstan has had trouble implementing 
large-scale mining projects due to mainly fi-
nancial and administrative difficulties.¹⁵ In 
general, the drastic transition from a socialist 
to a market economy has left chances neither 
gEnEral mining policy dEvElopmEnt 
in KyrgyzStan
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7to the government nor to the sector specialists 
to realize the market value of the existing min-
eral resources.¹6 In addition, there is a growing 
pressure to move the management of the Kyr-
gyz mining sector away from strict administra-
tive regulation towards more market economy 
based regulation.
 In general, broad state intervention has been 
a major feature of Kyrgyz mining regulation 
and policy. It has given immoderate power to 
officials, which has decreased the profitability 
of the sector for foreign investors. The prob-
lems with the operational conditions in the 
mining sector are further related to a lack of 
financial and technical capacity. Poor opera-
tional conditions are not only affecting coop-
eration between companies and the state, but 
are also undermining the relationship between 
communities and companies, since there is no 
adequate mechanism for companies to take 
into consideration the needs of local commu-
nities.¹⁷
General Mining Policy Development in Kyrgystan
8main actorS in crEating and implEmEnting 
mining rEgulation in KyrgyzStan
The administrative government in Kyrgyzstan 
may be divided into central and local govern-
ment. In the area of environmental and min-
eral regulation, the central government is re-
sponsible for granting licences and permits, 
expertise on environmental and social impact 
assessments, planning for regional and local 
development, control over the compliance with 
environmental standards and health and safe-
ty standards, and distributing revenues from 
mineral development.
 Each local administration has a number of 
tasks relating to mining activities in its area. 
For instance, local governance bodies are re-
sponsible for allotting lands for subsoil use 
after a company has been granted a mining 
licence. In general, environment and natural 
resource management in Kyrgyzstan has been 
impacted by decentralization developments 
and reforms of local government. These have 
resulted in a high level of overlap in the func-
tions, responsibilities, and authority among or-
ganizations of different levels of state and local 
governance bodies.¹⁸
 The history of the main environmental au-
thority of Kyrgyzstan is likewise marked with 
organizational reforms. Since 2005, the State 
Agency of Environmental Protection and For-
estry has been the body responsible for envi-
ronmental regulation. The low institutional 
status of the Agency has been said to create 
difficulties when it comes to defending ecologi-
cal interests and raising environmental priori-
ties.¹9 In 2009, the State Agency of Environ-
mental Protection and Forestry lost the major 
responsibility for environmental expertise and 
control in environmental protection relating to 
mining operations within the licensed sites to 
the Ministry of Natural Resources. In mining 
issues, the Agency’s main function was lim-
ited to environmental impact assessment on 
the lands of the state forest fund specially pro-
tected natural areas and the realization of the 
requirements of 13 international environmen-
tal agreements (conventions and protocols), 
including the Aarhus Convention on access 
to environmental information, public partici-
pation and access to justice in environmental 
matters.²0
 In the administrative mining sector, the State 
Agency for Geological and Mineral Resources 
was transformed into the Ministry of Natural 
Resources (Minprirody) in 2009. This change 
was said to reflect the (projected) significance 
of the mining industry in the future success of 
Kyrgyzstan.²¹ In addition, the transfer of the 
administrative functions on environmental 
protection and health and safety protection to 
a specific empowered body on subsoil use was 
justified by the idea of organizing the interac-
tion between the state and mining companies 
“in one window” in order to reduce risks of cor-
ruption.²²
 The Ministry was given an impressive num-
ber of functions, and also tasks that were pre-
viously the responsibility of other sectoral 
agencies were transferred to the new Minis-
try. The Ministry of Natural Resources was, 
for instance, responsible for mining licensing, 
supervision, normative regulation and policy 
development. This organizational “centraliza-
tion” development considerably simplified the 
operations of mining companies in the coun-
try, yet the ability, and interest, of the Ministry 
to safeguard e.g. environmental protection was 
questioned. 
 The Ministry of Natural Resources was al-
lowed to function for almost three years before 
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the next organizational reform was introduced. 
A new government was formed in Kyrgyzstan 
in late 2011, and it decided to abolish three 
ministries, among them the Ministry of Natu-
ral Resources. The Ministry was reorganized 
into the State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources (Gosgeolagentstvo).²³ In princi-
ple, thus, the Kyrgyz mining governance was 
returned to the same organizational level as 
it was before 2009 (i.e. divided between two 
state agencies), except for some competencies 
related to the state environmental expertise of 
projects within geological licensed sites that 
were retained. 
 It has been decided that the State Agency for 
Geology and Mineral Resources will retain li-
censing and monitoring functions (through its 
two departments: Mineral Resources Monitor-
ing and Analysis, and Subsoil Use Policy), while 
the concerned ministries will handle policy is-
sues.²⁴ The latter means that the functions re-
lated to mineral resources management policy 
are handed over to the Ministry of Economy 
and Anti-Monopoly Policy. The newly created 
State Agency for Geology and Mineral Resourc-
es will then implement the subsoil use poli-
cy.²⁵ The main tasks of the Agency have been 
defined as follows: systematic comprehensive 
study of the subsoil; state regulation of subsoil 
use issues; state control over the rational use 
of mineral resources of the Republic; and pro-
tection of the subsoil.²6 The detailed division 
of work between the state agencies of mining 
and environmental protection, and the re-es-
tablished State Inspection for Environmental 
and Technical Safety,²⁷ is still uncertain. Fur-
thermore, it appears that the functions of the 
sub-departments of the Mineral Agency are 
somewhat duplicative.
 This organizational change was rather sur-
prising, and its justifications have not been 
openly discussed, except for the general need 
to reduce state budget deficits and improve 
efficiency.²⁸ Perhaps it was thought that the 
general mining policy of the country should be 
subordinated under the Ministry of Economy 
instead of a sector-specific governance struc-
ture. In that way, according to the intentions, 
the government could have the mining policy 
under better control and it could be more ef-
fectively integrated with the more general 
economic plans and policies of the country. 
Nevertheless, it appears clear that the leading 
politicians were not satisfied with the way the 
Ministry of Natural resources had functioned. 
Time will tell how the Kyrgyz mining policy will 
be affected by the yet again reformed govern-
ance structure.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Decrease overlap in the functions, re-
sponsibilities, and authority among or-
ganizations of different levels of state 
and local governance bodies by assigning 
more clear-cut responsibilities to individ-
ual authorities. 
• Analyze the responsibilities of the State 
Agency for Geology and Mineral Re-
sources and reorganize sub-departments 
to maximize efficiency and increase func-
tionality of each department.
• Shift responsibilities on environmental 
protection from the State Agency for Ge-
ology and Mineral Resources to the State 
Agency of Environmental Protection and 
Forestry.
• Strengthen the institutional status of the 
State Agency of Environmental Protec-
tion and Forestry to give priority to envi-
ronmental protection in the licensing pro-
cess during exploration and exploitation.
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introduction: developments and development needs
In general, providing a comprehensive picture 
of the legal situation related to mining in Kyr-
gyzstan is challenging as the regulation has 
been renewed several times and it is split into 
numerous sectoral laws and blocs of regula-
tion. However, it is important to have these all 
covered because, as it has been said, “it is the 
holistic legal system that defines the relation-
ship between the regulator and the miner.”²9 
All parts have their important roles in the 
whole of the relevant legal system.
 The Kyrgyz legislation has been entirely re-
newed since the gaining of independence in 
1991. The reform process has not been without 
difficulties. The starting point was challenging 
and progress has at times been rather slow. It 
is clear that as the reform has been made in 
numerous steps and over many years, long-
term planning and coordination of the process 
have been poor or lacking altogether. Sectoral 
authorities may have had visions as to how 
the regulation should be improved, but these 
have not been properly reflected in practice 
and have at times contradicted the laws and 
objectives of other sectors. Furthermore, the 
government bureaucracy has remained ineffi-
cient, plagued by conflicts of interest, corrup-
tion, duplication of duties and ineffective com-
munication across agencies. 
 Problems of poor coordination and com-
munication have persisted to a significant ex-
tent across different functions of the central 
 administration and between the central and 
local governments. Also the quality of the re-
form efforts has often left something to be 
desired: the changes have in many cases been 
limited to formal legislative, organizational, 
and technical reforms that were arguably in 
some cases intended to please donors and se-
cure continued funding from international 
finance institutions.³0 The flood of new legal 
documents has been intense, leading in some 
cases to legal inflation and selective enforce-
ment of laws, and possibly to barriers to eco-
nomic development in the country.³¹
 The Kyrgyz government has more recently 
recognized problems that the mining indus-
try faces due to the inadequacy of mining 
legislation. These are considered to derive 
from the ongoing transition to market-based 
(economic) regulation. The imperfect regula-
tory framework has been acknowledged to 
cause inconsistency and ambiguity between 
and within relevant laws.³² Consequently, 
the government launched a programme “Im-
provement of the statutory and legal system”. 
The programme included preparation of a new 
edition of the Law on Subsoil³³ and bringing 
other laws regulating the use of subsurface 
resources into conformity with it along with 
amending and supplementing laws governing 
subsoil use. As a result, a comprehensive min-
ing code would have been developed to regu-
late all issues pertaining to use of subsurface 
Mining Regulation in the Kyrgyz Republic
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viewpoint, it is important to have a regulatory 
system that is stable, transparent and appro-
priate to the conditions of the country in terms 
of priorities, infrastructure and skills.³6 The 
relevant legal framework and individual rules 
have to be appropriate to the needs of differ-
ent actors, understandable and justified. When 
parties sense that they are fairly treated, they 
are more likely to comply with the regulation. 
However, this does not remove the need to 
have enforcement methods available.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Pursue strengthening and consolidation 
of laws pertaining to the use of subsur-
face resources, e.g. via implementation 
of the revised mining code, to create a 
coherent and enforceable framework for 
mining in Kyrgyzstan.
National Regulation of Mining in Kyrgystan
resources.³⁴ However, the implementation of 
the programme proceeded irregularly.
 The prevailing administrative inefficiency 
and confusing state functions, together with 
the legal nihilism of the population,³⁵ have 
formed a regrettable backdrop for conflict 
situations both between state and/or local 
administration and the mining industry, and 
between mining companies and local popula-
tions in Kyrgyzstan. Uncertainties regarding 
the future expected regulatory requirements 
and the level of rigor and consistency of the 
implementation of the existing policies and 
legislation undermine both the country’s busi-
ness environment and its social atmosphere in 
mining regions.
 In general, no country has a perfect legal 
system for mining. However, characteristics 
of ideal regulation may be defined. It has been 
argued that from the regulator’s perspective, a 
clear-cut, predictable and enforceable frame-
work is essential to control the activities of the 
mining industry effectively. From the industry 
12
 companies have been forced to stop their oper-
ations due to unsolved problems with land re-
sources and local communities in many parts 
of the country. The companies do not get any 
protection from the state authorities as local 
communities have very little belief in law and 
in the capacity of the state bodies. 
 In addition, the unsolved issue of acceptance 
of geological reports and issuance of licences 
to mining companies threatens the implemen-
tation of their operational plans. This could 
cause the disruption of the 2012 field season. 
Another serious drawback in the current regu-
lation of subsoil use is the fact that the actions 
of the Mineral Resources Agency do not envis-
age the diversity of forms for subsoil use, but 
impose only one administrative and command 
principle, i.e., the issuance of licences.
 As the result of the situation in the invest-
ment market, external investors have started 
to lodge their assets in projects in more sta-
ble countries. Furthermore, local investors 
tend to support only short-term projects in 
Kyrgyzstan. This has caused stagnation of the 
mining sector followed by instability in con-
sulting and other services. If political, eco-
nomic and social instability drags on, the min-
ing consulting services may lose the majority 
of their clients as well. 
For Kyrgyzstan, 2011 was marked with re-
arrangements of political elite groups and 
changes in political as well as economic influ-
ences. Continued redistribution of property 
and changes in the state administration led to 
the change of “play rules” for businesses. The 
national political instability and uncertainty 
gave rise to economic instability and even cha-
os. The geological sector, as the major sector 
generating budget revenue, was under a lot of 
pressure. According to the data of the Ministry 
of Natural Resources, the number of licensed 
sites for subsoil use was 998 as of 1 January 
2011. Of these, licences for prospecting of vari-
ous minerals were issued for 174 sites; licences 
for exploration for 215 sites; and licences for 
the development of mineral resources for 609 
sites. In 2010, the Ministry cancelled 550 li-
cences. 
 At the beginning of 2012, instability in the 
country and in the mining sector continued. 
The legal reform aimed at the introduction of 
new taxes and payments as well as increas-
ing legislative pressure is being implemented 
at an accelerated pace. The licensing process 
has been suspended for an uncertain period 
of time. Furthermore, general discontent 
with geological companies is growing among 
local communities. Consequently, mining 
trends in Subsoil use³7
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the legal framework for mining
Development of Regulation
The Law on Subsoil has been the principal reg-
ulatory instrument for mining activities in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. To signify the development of 
mineral resources as one of its economic de-
velopment priorities, Kyrgyzstan adopted the 
original 1992 Law on Subsoil as one of the first 
laws developed after the country gained inde-
pendence from the Soviet Union. The Law de-
clared a transition to a market economy, but in 
practice strict state control over subsoil users 
remained in place.³⁸ A kind of manifestation 
of this was the establishment of a complicated 
licensing system which has largely remained 
the same up to the present.
 The Kyrgyz legal regime of subsoil use was 
critically reviewed by external analysts in 
1990s, but it was not until 1997 that the new 
Law on Subsoil – that is in force even today 
– was adopted. The new law did not bring a 
radically novel approach to the governance of 
mining activities in Kyrgyzstan; the traditional 
“command and control” method was largely re-
tained. The shortcomings of the mining regula-
tory system were recognized in subsequent re-
view studies,³9 which largely recommended an 
administratively lightened control and licens-
ing system. The government took note of these 
results of policy studies and initiated a reform 
process for the country’s mining legislation. 
However, the process has seen many winding 
turns without a concrete final outcome.
 The mining legislation of Kyrgyzstan has in-
deed been subject to remarkable reform efforts 
in recent years. A new Law on Subsoil was 
passed by Parliament in late 2000s, but it was 
not signed into law by the President. The pro-
posed law was subject to considerable contro-
versy,⁴0 and, consequently, the draft appeared 
to have been left for further development for 
an indefinite period of time. 
 In April 2010, new draft laws on subsoil and 
related laws, prepared by the Ministry of Natu-
ral Resources, were introduced to the Parlia-
ment. However, the draft laws did not pass 
through the parliamentary procedure due to 
the change of the government.⁴¹ 
 A new effort to reform the legal framework 
for mining activities in Kyrgyzstan was intro-
duced in autumn 2011 as a Parliament Com-
mittee approved the three readings of the 
amendments to the Law on Subsoil. A change 
of government put this process to a halt, until a 
new hastily developed draft Law was present-
ed to the ministries and agencies for endorse-
ment in March 2012.⁴² It is illustrative that 
during the last five years, six ministers have in 
turn directed the reform of the Kyrgyz subsoil 
legislation, introducing their personal views 
into the content of the draft text of the new law. 
At the time of writing, the draft Law has just 
National Regulation of Mining in Kyrgystan
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substantially change many aspects of the cur-
rent mining licensing, regulatory, and fiscal re-
gime in Kyrgyzstan. The government has been 
determined to adopt a “hands-off” approach to 
the mining sector, leaving only relatively few 
issues in the hands of the government to con-
trol the fate of the mining licences.⁴⁸ The aims 
are to significantly reduce bureaucracy and 
to improve the functioning of market mecha-
nisms in the regulation of the mining sector of 
the country. 
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Make geological information available 
for mining companies and promote ex-
change of information among stakehold-
ers.
• Promote the options to award licences via 
an open tender process instead of closed 
negotiations between a mining company 
and the government.
• Pursue the implementation of the new 
Law on Subsoil.
The Legal Regime for Mining 
in Kyrgyzstan
The 1997 Law on Subsoil continues to be the 
most important regulatory instrument for 
the planning, operating and closing of mining 
activities in Kyrgyzstan. The Act defines the 
rights and responsibilities of the legislator and 
state, local authorities and the mining opera-
tor. Much of the Law on Subsoil is concerned 
with ownership issues, and with the procedure 
been given final consideration and acceptance 
by the Kyrgyz Parliament and President.
 Overall, the development of the new subsoil 
use regulation has been aiming at eliminat-
ing shortcomings in matters of licensing and 
preventing corruption mechanisms within the 
mining regulation. Further goals have been 
the improvement of the publicity of mining 
operations and bringing additional funding to 
the national budget. Furthermore, the new law 
has been expected to prohibit approvals on the 
development of mining sites located near stra-
tegic ecologic locations such as rivers, lakes 
and glaciers.⁴³ It has been said that the law 
would thus provide the restriction to keep un-
der lock and key crucial territories to protect 
the environment.⁴⁴
 The economic instruments intended to be 
introduced into the Kyrgyz mining sector 
regulation include competition and auction 
processes in the distribution of licences, and 
a fee for holding a licence. It is supposed that 
the latter would encourage subsoil users to 
start developing their deposits faster than is 
currently the common practice. Moreover, the 
new draft law would allow direct negotiations 
as a licensing procedure only in special cases 
(when the subsoil use rights are not related to 
exploration and development of mineral re-
sources).⁴⁵ Subsoil use rights with respect to 
mineral deposits of national importance would 
then be provided solely by means of a tender.⁴6 
From the viewpoint of the mining industry, the 
planned legislative reform has been said to fall 
short of the needs of the business as the discre-
tionary rights of the authorities would not be 
reduced and as geological information would 
be declared state property.⁴⁷ From the view-
point of local communities and conflict pre-
vention, an open tender process would be bet-
ter than closed negotiations between a mining 
company and the government.
 In any case, whenever finally becoming ef-
fective, the new Law on Subsoil is expected to 
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and conditions for subsoil use. Environmen-
tal and social issues of mining activities have 
been left for other sector-based regulation.
 The first stage of a new mining project is 
prospecting works and then exploration of re-
serves. In conducting geological exploration 
of subsoil, companies operating in Kyrgyzstan 
are required by law to take measures for en-
vironmental protection. Exploration activities 
are subject to licensing. In the same vein, if a 
mineral deposit is found, the operator needs a 
licence for its exploitation.
 If the exploration has proved successful, the 
company needs to obtain a “licence to use sub-
soil with the purpose of development of min-
eral resource deposits, including man-made 
ones”. It should be noted that small-scale ar-
tisanal mining activities are not subjected to 
licensing in the country. However, artisanal 
miners should, in principle, register with local 
authorities.
 The State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources is the main permitting authority for 
the mining sector in Kyrgyzstan. Currently, li-
cences are usually issued through direct nego-
tiations. If the applying company has discov-
ered a deposit after a legal exploration, it has 
a preferential right to obtain a licence for its 
mining.⁴9 This is a reasonable policy as invest-
ment in exploration is unlikely if the investor 
has no assurance of being able to secure rights 
to exploit the mineral deposits it discovers. 
However, the new draft of the Law on Subsoil 
would impose some limits to this practice. Ac-
cordingly, competitive tenders and auctions 
would be the major mechanisms for granting 
of mining licences. It could be supposed that 
the broader introduction of tender and auc-
tions processes⁵0 would bring more competi-
tion to the Kyrgyz mining licensing and stop 
speculation with licences – thereby collecting 
more revenue for the state.
 The right to access subsoil to develop min-
eral resources in Kyrgyzstan is implemented 
in two stages. At first, a licence accompanied 
by a licence agreement, which foresees devel-
opment of the project or feasibility study, is is-
sued. The licence is valid for two years. When 
the project (feasibility study) has been com-
pleted and tested, the licence for development 
is issued for the term defined in the feasibility 
study. Generally, the validity of mining licenc-
es in Kyrgyzstan is considered short compared 
to most of the developed industrialized coun-
tries.⁵¹ The new draft Law on Subsoil would 
set the validity of mineral development licenc-
es to be “up to 20 years”.⁵² Thus, authorities 
would be left with discretionary power to de-
termine the term of use of mineral resources. 
Generally, mining licences may be reviewed 
whenever remarkable changes are introduced 
to the activity.
 Generally, Kyrgyz rules and regulations do 
not make a difference between the mining 
rights of domestic parties and foreign parties. 
It is not necessary for a foreign company to 
have a domestic partner.⁵³ Licence rights can 
also be pledged or transferred to third parties, 
with the agreement of the mineral resources 
authority. On the other hand, mining opera-
tions need legal continuity and security. There-
fore, the law states that once a mineral right 
has been granted, it cannot be suspended or 
revoked except on carefully specified grounds 
set out in law.⁵⁴
 Once a company has completed mining 
works in Kyrgyzstan, it is legally obliged to 
close the mine. The subsoil users that operate 
under a licence are required to present their fi-
nancial guarantees for restoration of the dam-
aged environment.⁵⁵ Furthermore, licensing 
agreements for exploitation of deposits typi-
cally require the miner to environmentally 
restore the mine site after use. The required 
closure includes mandatory rehabilitation of 
land. A re-cultivation plan is required from 
the companies, which shall be approved by the 
authorities.⁵6 In addition, mining companies 
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must be prepared for environmental rehabili-
tation by placing a financial guarantee to the 
effect that re-cultivation works will be under-
taken upon completion of mining works. How-
ever, it has been reported that in practice such 
guarantee is not provided due to the absence 
of established terms and conditions of provid-
ing such payments.⁵⁷ The new Law on Subsoil 
could possibly solve the present unclear situ-
ation: the draft law obliges the mining com-
pany to set up a recovery and liquidation fund 
in a bank. The account of the fund should be 
regularly replenished. The means of this fund 
could not be used for other purposes.⁵⁸ This 
arrangement could increase the confidence of 
local communities and mining authorities in 
the presented closure and environmental re-
habilitation plans of mining companies, and 
thus contribute towards lessening tensions 
around new mining projects.⁵9
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Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Ensure that environmental and social is-
sues of mining activities are considered 
an integral part of sector-based regula-
tion.
• Review the introduction of tender and 
auction processes to increase competi-
tion to the Kyrgyz mining licensing as a 
measure to increase state revenue.
• Ensure integration of mine closure 
works, including re-cultivation, into the 
mine licensing requirements via environ-
mental funds accumulated during mine 
operations and provide valid terms and 
conditions for the funds.
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 The original agreement was then replaced 
by an Investment Agreement, concluded in 
2004. The new agreement included regulatory 
and tax relief that was given to the Centerra 
company operating the Kumtor mine. These 
clauses had the purpose of ensuring greater 
predictability and stability of the investment 
environment for the company. Furthermore, 
towards the same end, the Investment Agree-
ment provided Centerra with guarantees 
against expropriation and rights to non-dis-
crimination. It also stipulated that Centerra is 
entitled to all necessary permits and approvals 
relating to the Kumtor mine, including with 
respect to environmental matters and hiring 
of foreign nationals. Easements of regulatory 
requirements were also granted with regard 
to the company’s import of any capital equip-
ment and operating supplies. Finally, Centerra 
was granted the right to export any of its prod-
ucts free of export duty and other charges and 
without unreasonable formalities that delay or 
hinder such exports.66
 Towards the end of the 2000s, the Kyrgyz 
Government and Centerra started re-negoti-
ations on the Kumtor Investment Agreement. 
The process was difficult and ended up in a 
stalemate several times. Finally, the Restated 
Investment Agreement was signed in June 
2009. The new agreement established a simpli-
fied tax regime for the Kumtor mine, removing 
mining agreements: 
regulatory flexibility and political controversies
To complement licensing, mining agreements 
are also in use in Kyrgyzstan when new mining 
operations are about to be started (or existing 
agreements are renewed). Nowadays, a licence 
agreement is an integral part of the mining li-
cence, which is not valid without it.60 The right 
to use subsoil may also be granted by conces-
sion6¹ or on the basis of a production sharing 
agreement.6²
 By way of an example, the agreements on 
the Kumtor mine will be shortly discussed 
here.6³ It is to be noted that the ratification of 
the agreements by the Kyrgyz Parliament has 
provided the Kumtor project a special status. 
This example of special relations between the 
investor and the government is an exception 
and does not have analogues for other mining 
projects in the country.
 The 1992 “Master Agreement”6⁴ established 
the applicable rules and regulations with re-
spect to the exploitation of Kumtor. These in-
cluded the tenure of mineral and surface rights, 
operating obligations, applicable taxes (includ-
ing a ten-year exemption on profit tax),6⁵ em-
ployment of Kyrgyz citizens and the import 
and export of funds, materials and gold pro-
duced from the Kumtor mine. Naturally, other 
laws and regulations of general application in 
the Kyrgyz Republic also applied to the opera-
tion of the Kumtor mine, except to the extent 
they conflicted with the mining agreements.
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a number of previously valid taxes and stabi-
lizing many of the remaining ones. In general, 
tax stabilization agreements between mining 
companies and host governments are some-
times negotiated separately from more general 
mining development agreements, which typi-
cally address a broad range of issues within a 
particular project only.6⁷ In Kyrgyzstan, it ap-
pears that the Tax Code6⁸ serves as a kind of 
general tax stabilization agreement whereas 
more detailed provisions are included in min-
ing agreements or specific investment treaties.
 Even after the 2009 Agreement, the Kyrgyz 
government has been contemplating means to 
increase its share in Centerra’s operation in 
the country. Recently, a commission studied 
the company’s compliance with the norms and 
requirements on the rational use of natural re-
sources, protection of the environment, indus-
trial safety and social protection of the popula-
tion from the impact of the gold mine. In the 
course of these discussions, the majority of 
deputy members of the Commission support-
ed the idea of reviewing all agreements and 
contracts signed in the past, the conditions of 
which are not to be considered beneficial for 
Kyrgyzstan. In other words, the main objective 
of the effort is to increase the share of the Kyr-
gyz side in Centerra Gold/Kumtor.69
 Sometimes host country governments prac-
tically force mining companies to renegotiate 
their licence agreements. This has happened 
also in Kyrgyzstan. For instance, the increased 
price of gold was the driver that initially made 
the Kyrgyz government start renegotiations on 
the Kumtor gold mine agreement in the late 
2000s.⁷0 This kind of action is naturally not 
welcomed by the mining companies, and cre-
ated an environment of uncertainty that may 
affect all mining projects in the country. Simi-
lar strong discontent and uncertainty have 
been felt by investors towards Kyrgyzstan’s 
recent record of withdrawing licences from 
one company to award them to another. Jerooy 
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gold deposit is an example of this latter prac-
tice. The Kyrgyz government withdrew the 
licence to develop the deposit from its owner 
in late 2010 and announced that a new tender 
would be held for the field. The official reason 
for tearing up the 2006 licence agreement was 
that the venture had failed to make good on its 
commitment to start construction of an ore-
enrichment factory by an agreed date.⁷¹
 Another case where mining rights have been 
subject to withdrawal efforts is the Andash min-
ing site. The Kyrgyz Parliament passed a Reso-
lution in June 2011 to the effect of suspending 
all activities related to the development of the 
Andash gold-copper mine, revoking all permits 
and cancelling the land use permit. The mem-
ber of the Parliament who proposed the Resolu-
tion claimed that the mining company’s activi-
ties neglect environmental safety and pollute 
water with industrial waste. It appeared, how-
ever, that the claims had not been taken up with 
the company or authorities. It was considered 
unlikely that the Government would accept the 
Resolution. The Parliament does not have the 
power to revoke mining licences, only the Min-
istry of Natural Resources could do that and 
only under specified conditions. The Ministry 
informed the mining operator that it complies 
with all legal requirements and standards of 
licence activity in Kyrgyzstan.⁷² The situation 
has remained unresolved while the mining 
company has decided to stop the development 
of the Andash site.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Provide a stable investment environment 
by establishing and enforcing sound rules 
and regulations for mining agreements, 
including licence agreements.
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 payments. The major source of revenues for lo-
cal governments is “shared revenues” or trans-
fers from taxes collected by the state and then 
allocated with uniform rates to local adminis-
trations.⁷⁸ The current situation where local 
governments benefit only indirectly from the 
profits made by mining companies operating 
in their area has received increased criticism 
in Kyrgyzstan. This state of affairs is one of 
the main reasons for local opposition to min-
ing projects as many people perceive that the 
big profits that mining companies make do not 
benefit the local area but the tax payments go 
to the bottomless state budget. 
 Not much concrete was done to amelio-
rate the situation before an initiative for a law 
amendment was introduced in 2011. The ini-
tiative proposed an allocation of 2 per cent of 
the proceeds of mining companies into local 
budgets. Behind the proposal were members 
of the Kyrgyz Parliament who saw the initiative 
as a way to improve the country’s investment 
attractiveness. According to the most ardent 
defender of the initiative, MP Iskhak Pirmatov, 
it would relieve tension at mining districts and 
diminish opposition and assaults against min-
ing companies by local people. The initiative 
would give local self-government freedom to 
decide how and when to spend the money, and 
public supervisory boards would be obliged to 
monitor the transparency of the actions.⁷9 The 
Ministry of Natural Resources considered that 
fees and taxes: a Burden for mining companies
The host country to a mining project seeks to 
benefit from the industry by collecting a variety 
of taxes and other payments from mining com-
panies. There are a number of fees and taxes 
that a mining company active in Kyrgyzstan 
has to pay in different phases of its operations.
 According to the Kyrgyz Tax Code, a min-
ing company is subject to a single bonus pay-
ment for the right to use subsoil, and regular 
royalty payments for the extraction of mineral 
resources. The bonus is essentially a licensing 
fee that is comparably high (amounting to 0.05 
per cent of the value of estimated reserves at 
2009 market prices).⁷³ Few other countries 
apply this kind of tax: licensing payments are 
usually based on land area rather than the val-
ue of estimated reserves.⁷⁴ A royalty is essen-
tially a tax on mineral production, based on the 
state’s sovereign ownership over the resource 
and is paid in exchange for the right to extract 
the mineral substance.⁷⁵ The rate of the royal-
ty in Kyrgyzstan is set for each type of mineral 
resources as a percentage of the proceeds.⁷6
 In addition, there are land taxes and cor-
porate income taxes that all business in Kyr-
gyzstan have to pay. It should be noted that 
small-scale artisanal mining is exempted from 
the payment of taxes and royalties on use of the 
subsurface.⁷⁷
 Generally local governments do not direct-
ly receive tax revenue from mining compa-
nies, except via land tax and other very small 
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the 2 per cent payment scheme would assist in 
the challenge of letting mining investors and 
local communities work together.⁸0 
 The initiative has given rise to reservations 
within mining companies. It has been point-
ed out that the Kumtor Operating Company 
has been paying, according to the established 
agreement through the Issyk-Kul Development 
Fund, a significant amount of money to the lo-
cal administration. The company has not, how-
ever, received any report as to how the prov-
ince has spent the money. Furthermore, the 
company suspects that the central government 
will respectively reduce local budgets with rev-
enue accounting.⁸¹ Mining industry represent-
atives stated that in the planning of mandatory 
payments, the experience of Kumtor should be 
taken into account, and the size of the deduc-
tions should be 1 per cent, the same that ap-
plies to the Issyk-Kul Fund.⁸² The government 
line was that 2 per cent is the minimum rate 
for the payment; it was pointed out that in Ka-
zakhstan such payments constitute 5.5 per cent 
and in Russia 7 per cent.⁸³
 In general, investors have a very reserved at-
titude towards the 2 per cent proposal. In their 
opinion, it does not guarantee protection of the 
rights of business, and remarkably contradicts 
the current legislation and may even lead to 
new unrest among the local population.⁸⁴ The 
mining industry is concerned about the trans-
parency of the distribution of the funds: what 
decision-making mechanisms would be used 
in the allocation of funds, and does the com-
munity trust local authorities in this respect? 
Mining companies have expressed their need 
for safety guarantees if they are required to pay 
a portion of their profit to local governments as 
requested.⁸⁵ Furthermore, it has been consid-
ered unfair to burden only mining companies 
with additional payments; other sectors of the 
economy could be engaged, too.⁸6 Finally, it 
has been pointed out that the situation of lo-
cal governments with regard to income from 
mining activities is not as grim as it may seem. 
Arguably, local authorities have in recent years 
collected increasingly (excessively) high land-
use fees from mining companies.⁸⁷ These col-
lected funds have not, however, been observ-
able to local communities and their welfare.
 A slightly more open attitude has been shown 
by the company operating the Andash mining 
site: they have said that although naturally not 
welcoming additional charges and fees, the 
current state of affairs in the mining industry 
in Kyrgyzstan may warrant such measures as 
the 2 per cent local tax if it will help compa-
nies to get started with their business.⁸⁸ The 
company’s view is understandable as they had 
to step back from the licensed Andash mining 
area due to severe conflicts with local people. 
More generally, investment security is very im-
portant for any mining company operating in 
Kyrgyzstan. If the 2 per cent payment scheme 
guarantees a safe working environment for 
the mining industry, their opposition would 
no longer be a concern. The General Director 
of Andash Mining Company has furthermore 
stated that setting standards for local budget 
contributions will help to limit unreasonable 
requests from the local people to mining com-
panies and improve relations with the local 
population. As a result, investment in the min-
ing industry is arguably likely to grow.⁸9 This 
appears a reasonable line of thinking, although 
further practical issues (e.g. the use of the col-
lected funds at the local level, the perceived in-
adequateness of the 2 per cent fee in relation to 
the profits of the mining industry) may cause 
also new unrest among local communities.
 The 2 per cent mandatory payment for min-
ing companies was accepted by the Kyrgyz Par-
liament in late 2011.90 However, the President 
used his veto right and did not sign the new 
Law on Non-Tax Payments. The Parliament is 
currently attempting to overcome the veto.
 Besides the official tax regime, the tax rate 
of a mining company operating in Kyrgyzstan 
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may be determined by arrangements agreed 
upon in a special agreement as was done with 
Kumtor (see the text on mining agreements 
above). As these agreements are negotiated be-
tween the company and the government, they 
may contain a scheme of special treatment 
with regard to the tax (mining-related and oth-
er) scheme for the company. This kind of dif-
ferential treatment, the main element of which 
is usually tax stabilization, may be necessary 
to attract or maintain mining business in the 
country, but it is also a problematic practice in 
some respects. Overall, it should be noted that 
the agreement made on Kumtor is an original 
and special case in the Kyrgyz mining sector. 
 It has been said that the two licensing fees 
(the bonus and royalty) in combination have 
made Kyrgyzstan one of the costliest countries 
in the world in which to conduct mining explo-
ration and production.9¹ The high mineral tax 
and administrative cost regime could perhaps 
partly explain the relatively limited develop-
ment to date of Kyrgyzstan’s mineral wealth 
and the relative absence of major mining com-
panies from Kyrgyzstan.9² On the other hand, 
other political and administrative barriers have 
probably affected the development more. More 
recent comments by mining industry repre-
sentatives have, nevertheless, been voiced in 
a more positive tone. For instance, the Kyrgyz 
tax regime for mining companies has been de-
scribed as “attractive”9³ and as “definitely the 
best in the region and one of the best in the 
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world”.9⁴ Indeed, currently the overall tax bur-
den for mining companies, including all pay-
ments into the state budget, comprises 12–15 
per cent of the company proceeds. This is very 
low compared to other countries.9⁵ These ef-
forts of the Kyrgyz government to make the 
general investment climate of the country at-
tractive for foreign business have not gone 
unnoticed by investors, including those in the 
mining industry.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Increase local benefits from mining ac-
tivities to raise living standards in min-
ing areas.
• Identify mechanisms to create direct 
benefits from mining operations to local 
governments.
• Provide standards for local budget con-
tributions to channel requests from the 
local people to mining companies and to 
improve relations with the local popula-
tion.
• Identify appropriate decision-making 
mechanisms for the allocation of funds 
to local budgets.
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problems in mining licensing
Despite recommendations towards increasing 
openness,96 the mining permitting process 
has not been open to direct civil society par-
ticipation.9⁷ During recent years, however, the 
public has been involved, to some extent, in the 
permitting activities. Importantly, the mem-
bership of the licensing commission has been 
extended through the involvement of deputies 
of the Parliament, prosecutors, representatives 
of other ministries and public groups. Thus, 
civil society participation is also allowed in the 
licensing commission, and an additional ob-
servatory board has been established.9⁸ How-
ever, the State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources has the ultimate power to make li-
censing determinations, and public participa-
tion is many times more pro forma than really 
influential on the final outcome. In general, it 
would be a wise policy to make the local com-
munity aware of the planned mining project 
and to ask for their genuine contribution to the 
activity. This would work towards releasing 
tensions and the significant conflict potential 
that new mining projects face in Kyrgyzstan.
 It was reported in 2008 that the state min-
ing authority had issued around 1 500 licences 
in total. However, almost 90 per cent of the 
licence holders were not operating at that 
time.99 It is remarkable that only two gold de-
posits (Kumtor and Solton-Sary) have actually 
been put into operation in Kyrgyzstan over the 
last 15 years (not taking into account deposits 
of local construction materials). A government 
commission has found that the majority of the 
mining-related licences were received for the 
purpose of speculation and for increasing the 
share value of the company, and not for the 
purpose of conducting actual mining activity. 
The Law on Subsoil has provided significant 
discretionary powers to officials with regard to 
licence issuance and cancellation, and has al-
lowed any person, including those completely 
unrelated to the mining industry and without 
financial capability, to receive and retain li-
cences for speculation purposes.¹00
 State deputies have explained the situation 
by the fact that the majority of subsurface re-
source use licences were issued without any 
tenders, by direct negotiations between the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and subsoil us-
ers.¹0¹ It could be expected that if companies 
had to invest in tender processes, they would 
not obtain the respective licences for specula-
tive purposes only.
 The Kyrgyz government has recently adopt-
ed a strict policy as a response to the specu-
lative mining licence acquisition. In January 
2011, by an order of the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, the issuing and renewal of licences 
and licence agreements for geological research 
and development of mineral fields were sus-
pended.¹0² During the suspension, the length 
of which was not announced, authorities will 
review fulfilment of licence agreement terms 
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before company reports and 2012 work plans 
are approved. It was reported that 260 licences 
were revoked after 10 months in 2011. There 
had been cases where companies had been 
delaying the start of work for 11 years; under-
standably, the authorities were determined to 
put an end to empty promises of mining in-
vestments.¹0³
 The strong line of action is to an extent un-
derstandable since the government no longer 
wants to support mining companies that fail 
to proceed with actual mining and extrac-
tion. This kind of setting never meets the aim 
of issuing mining licences because the Kyrgyz 
economy never receives the promised invest-
ments, the state budget never sees tax rev-
enues, jobs are never created and services are 
never purchased from the adjacent-sector pro-
viders.¹0⁴ On the other hand, the suspension 
policy could and has been criticized. Perhaps 
most importantly, the policy creates remark-
able uncertainty for investors. While the gov-
ernment is weeding out ineffective companies 
that are not actively developing their holdings, 
the government review is causing “consider-
able problems” for companies that have ac-
quired their licences with good intentions.¹0⁵ 
Experts have called the suspension decision 
“unprofessional and tendentious”.¹06 The situ-
ation has resulted in numerous lawsuits where 
the cancellation of licences has been claimed 
as illegal. Some of the cases have actually been 
won by subsoil users. However, the execution 
of the judgments has been delayed.¹0⁷
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Implement a public mining cadastre that 
contains geological information on min-
ing sites, admissibility of sites for licens-
ing, ownership information and so on.¹0⁸
• Continue strengthening the role of pub-
lic participation in the mine licensing 
process via greater representation of the 
public in the licensing commission and 
increase the commission’s influence in 
the decision-making vis-à-vis the State 
Agency for Geology and Mineral Re-
sources.
• Raise awareness within the affected 
community regarding planned mining 
projects and encourage active participa-
tion in the decision-making process.
• Pursue the establishment of a tender-
ing process to award mining licences in-
stead of direct negotiations between the 
State Agency for Geology and Mineral 
Resources and potential subsoil users to 
avoid speculative mining licence acquisi-
tion.
• Develop a screening mechanism for li-
cence holders to reduce the risk of specu-
lative mining licence acquisition.
• Adopt a flexible approach to advance 
mining site development taking into con-
sideration screening results and compa-
ny structure. 
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assessment of Environmental impacts of mining 
and the public’s Environmental rights in Kyrgyzstan
Mining does not take place in a vacuum; it is 
bound to have effects on the surrounding en-
vironment and the local community. Assess-
ment and analysis of these negative impacts is 
vital to bring them to the attention of all ac-
tors and to give rise to appropriate reactions 
towards their reduction or elimination.
 Ideally, environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) is the delivery of high quality informa-
tion from the company (or other actor respon-
sible for the given project) to the community, 
the government and other decision-makers. 
In Kyrgyzstan, environmental impact assess-
ments are legally required to be carried out on 
new mining projects. The process takes place 
in two stages: first, the operator must conduct 
an EIA and prepare an environmental impact 
statement (EIS). Second, the assessment must 
be followed by a positive State Environmental 
Expertise (SEE) report. 
 Public participation is mandatory at all 
stages of the environmental impact assess-
ment procedure.¹09 The project developer is 
obliged to subject the Environmental Impact 
Statement to public scrutiny and to revise the 
Statement based on the feedback. The instruc-
tion on environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) procedure of September 1997 provides 
detailed requirements for the provision to the 
public of information on the project, for the 
EIA statement and documentation as well as 
for the organization of public hearings.  Despite 
these advanced guidelines, the practice has 
been criticized for not ensuring that the pub-
lic should be or has actually been informed 
about the reasons for not reflecting its com-
ments or proposals in the summary of public 
comments that the developer is submitting to 
SEE. Furthermore, the instruction does not 
oblige the SEE authority to inform the public 
about its decisions.¹¹0 These are serious flaws, 
as there seems to be very inadequate follow-up 
to public participation in the EIA process. The 
instruction and its application may give the 
impression that the public is actively engaged 
in the project planning, whereas in reality the 
participation is limited to one project stage 
without much attention to the outcome. 
 To help countries to deal with activities 
that are likely to have environmental impacts 
across boundaries, the Espoo Convention on 
Transboundary Environmental Impact As-
sessment¹¹¹ was adopted in 1991. Kyrgyzstan 
joined the Convention in 2001. The first real 
test for the implementation of the Espoo Con-
vention in Kyrgyzstan came in 2007 when a pi-
lot project “EIA in a Transboundary Context: 
Pilot Implementation Project in Central Asia” 
was organized by the Organization for Securi-
ty and Co-operation in Europe and the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
under the Environment and Security (ENVS-
EC) initiative. The project was operational in 
2007–2008 and focused in Kazakhstan and 
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Kyrgyzstan while bearing relevance for the 
whole Central Asia region.¹¹² The provisions 
of the Espoo Convention have been applied in 
a couple of similar cases after the successful 
pilot project. 
 Kyrgyzstan joined the Aarhus Convention 
on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters in January 2001. The 
Aarhus Convention has been very significant 
for Kyrgyzstan and similarly for other former 
Soviet Union states. After independence, these 
countries had moved to greater openness in 
their overall state policies. However, there 
was still little recognition among officials that 
they were obliged to provide environmental 
informa tion upon request to the public, for ex-
ample. The administrations and legal systems 
in these countries were not oriented to serving 
NGOs and citizens.¹¹³ In addition, people were 
not aware of their rights to receive and submit 
environmental information and participate in 
decision-making.¹¹⁴
 Kyrgyzstan has made its legislation conform 
to the requirements of the Aarhus Convention. 
The most remarkable asset of the Aarhus Con-
vention in relation to access to information for 
Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries 
has been the provision that officials should 
provide envi ronmental information without 
demanding that an interest in obtaining the 
information be explained by the requester.¹¹⁵ 
Nowadays, the public’s information rights are, 
in principle, quite well secured in Kyrgyzstan. 
However, there are situations where the rights 
are not fully respected. It may be that the pub-
lic has been initially informed and heard in the 
preparation of a new mining project, for exam-
ple, but no obligation has been established in 
the legislation to inform the public about the 
decisions taken, along with the reasons and 
considerations on which they are based.¹¹6 It 
has been assessed that the problem in Kyr-
gyzstan is not so much access to information 
on request (passive access to information) as 
keeping the public informed in order to facili-
tate considered decision-making (active access 
to information). The reasons for this include 
lack of funds, the absence of clear-cut proce-
dures and arguably also pure ignorance of the 
rights of the public.¹¹⁷ The problem is not to 
be taken lightly as a poorly informed public 
tends to act according to its worst-case scenar-
ios, causing trouble that could sometimes be 
helped with appropriate information-sharing 
by the relevant authorities.
 The implementation of public participation 
in environmental decision-making in Kyr-
gyzstan is not very straightforward.¹¹⁸ The 
regulation is scattered in various sources. Con-
sequently, realization of public participation in 
environmental decision-making in Kyrgyzstan 
has received quite a lot of criticism. According 
to the most extreme view, public participation 
in the decision-making process in Kyrgyzstan 
is usually just for show.¹¹9 In any case, the 
problem is both in the legislation and in its 
implementation. For instance, licence appli-
cants are not encouraged by domestic law to 
exchange information with the public.¹²0 Pub-
lic participation in environmental decision-
making in Kyrgyzstan is, thus, largely hap-
hazardly organized. This has, in some cases, 
pushed people to take action on their own, to 
make their views heard in more forceful, even 
violent ways.
 Generally, transformation towards more 
participatory decision-making in Kyrgyzstan 
has largely been initiated and assisted by in-
ternational inputs. The availability of interna-
tional expertise, the influence of international 
conventions such as the Aarhus Convention, 
and the operation of international develop-
ment organizations as well as investors in the 
country have all contributed towards granting 
the public a more participatory role in the deci-
sion-making and governance of the country.¹²¹
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Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Introduce and implement a mechanism 
by which the State Ecological Expertise 
authority is required to justify the rejec-
tion of comments and proposals by the 
public, and inform the public about its 
decisions.
• Continue strengthening awareness 
among the local population regarding 
their rights to receive and submit envi-
ronmental information and participate 
in decision-making.
• Continue developing procedures for in-
formation exchange between mining 
companies, government and the public.
• Secure sufficient funds to implement ap-
propriate information exchange and pub-
lic participation (e.g. via licence fees).
 Under the Aarhus Convention, access to jus-
tice covers cases where the rights enshrined in 
the first two pillars of the Convention (access 
to justice and public participation) have alleg-
edly been violated. In addition, access to jus-
tice must be provided in all cases where a per-
son or organization claims that environmental 
law has been breached. In Kyrgyzstan, access 
to justice in environmental matters is general-
ly provided without limitations.¹²² Neverthe-
less, this right is not very widely used; Kyrgyz 
people often prefer more direct and informal 
ways to express their discontent with the way 
their procedural environmental rights are im-
plemented.
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consideration of Social impacts of mining in Kyrgyzstan
Besides the obvious fact that mining activi-
ties always come with environmental impacts, 
they also always affect local people’s lives on 
the social side.¹²³ The impacts can be related 
to, for instance, people’s livelihoods and work-
ing conditions, education, social relations, and 
health and safety.
 In general, social concerns are, or should be, 
usually included to a varying extent in an en-
vironmental impact assessment (EIA) of a new 
mining project. Sometimes these processes 
specifically become “environmental and social 
impact assessments” (ESIAs), though usu-
ally the role of social impacts therein is much 
smaller than that of the biophysical assess-
ments¹²⁴); sometimes a separate social im-
pact assessment (SIA) is made in the context 
of new mining projects. In essence, an SIA is 
concerned with the identification and mitiga-
tion of both positive and adverse social im-
pacts that may arise from the establishment of 
a mine, for example.¹²⁵ ESIAs should ensure 
that mining is carried out in an environmental 
and socially responsible way.
 Kyrgyz mining-related regulations men-
tion the assessment of social impacts in the 
instructions on the environmental impact as-
sessment procedure.¹²6 Accordingly, the EIA 
includes social effects, the EIA being a “socio-
environmental-economic analysis of intended 
project aspects”, “with the assistance of pub-
lic hearings.”¹²⁷ The general criteria of social 
effects detection have been set as to possibly 
include “population’s health and security, pos-
sible resettlement to other districts, changes in 
usual living conditions and traditional forms 
of employment, proximity to recreation zones, 
natural reservations, archeological, ethnic and 
historic monuments.”¹²⁸ The assessment must 
then identify the degree of public concern 
based on the gathered information. The infor-
mation is part of official EIA materials.¹²9
 In practice, social impacts of mining projects 
in Kyrgyzstan are assessed as part of their gen-
eral feasibility studies.¹³0 A feasibility study to 
be submitted to the authorities together with 
a mining licence application includes an EIA 
statement (covering environmental, social, 
economic, etc., impacts of a project). In fact, 
the applicant needs to have acquired an OVOS 
(a specific environmental and social permit, 
corresponds to an accepted EIA) before a min-
ing licence can be applied for and granted.
 Many times international standards are also 
applied in the assessment of the environmen-
tal and social impacts of new mining projects. 
An SIA or ESIA is often conducted in projects 
financed by international organizations (such 
as the World Bank or the Asian Development 
Bank).¹³¹ These assessments are naturally 
separate from the Kyrgyz national require-
ments, but they can nevertheless contribute 
towards more profound assessments of project 
impacts on the ground level.
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 Overall within the Kyrgyz context, the as-
sessment of the social impacts of mining pro-
jects is not a well-established standard proce-
dure. Social impacts are, as a rule, assessed to 
some extent, but the process and its outcomes 
lack coherence and effectiveness. Too often a 
project’s social impacts are only rather briefly 
and superficially accounted for, without genu-
ine research and public participation in the 
process. This practice needs to change: social 
impact assessment must be better institution-
alized in the country with the introduction of 
appropriate legislation and promotion by min-
ing companies, authorities and NGOs.
 It is important to note that social impacts of 
mining are often tackled by voluntary corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives and 
programmes that mining companies operat-
ing in Kyrgyzstan implement. It can be said 
that today, the mining industry is very much 
concerned about the possible impacts of envi-
ronmental and social issues on its business ac-
tivities and therefore those issues have become 
key agenda items.¹³² In essence, the compa-
nies face the fact that they need to obtain a 
“social licence to operate” and engage with key 
stakeholders at every stage of the mining life-
cycle.¹³³
 Corporate social responsibility practices in-
clude community development and going be-
yond compliance with local and national laws. 
A social impact assessment should be the first 
step when a mining company is developing 
its CSR policy. On that basis, a company may 
launch a variety of community involvement 
initiatives at the site level. Today, mining com-
pany CSR policies are a mixture of general and 
industry-wide initiatives and contextual com-
pany- and site-specific policies and projects. 
Despite some internationally agreed voluntary 
guidelines,¹³⁴ the field of mining CSR is very 
complex as the implemented activities cover 
such a wide range of initiatives.
 Within the Kyrgyz context, the mining 
 industry has initially been relatively cautious 
in introducing CSR principles into their opera-
tions in the country. This is said to be largely 
a reflection of the obsolete legal framework, 
which practically discourages companies from 
financing social programmes, from imple-
menting social projects and from increasing 
their partnership in charitable activities.¹³⁵ 
In addition, the role of the state authorities in 
promoting CSR movement has arguably been 
rather weak. In essence, Kyrgyzstan is lacking 
a strong state policy intended for CSR of busi-
ness.¹³6 The policy to be established should 
be based on voluntarism, however. Active in-
volvement of all parties (business, state, mass 
media and society) is required in this issue.¹³⁷ 
 At the company level, Centerra Gold operat-
ing the Kumtor mine has taken initiatives to-
wards tackling the socio-economic impacts of 
the mine. The company has had the practice 
of setting aside funds to be used to different 
capacity-building projects within Kyrgyzstan. 
Under the terms of the newest agreement with 
the Kyrgyz government, the company pays 1 
per cent of the gross revenue from the mine to 
the Issyk-Kul Development Fund.¹³⁸ Centerra 
has also created the Kumtor microcredit public 
fund and provides financial support to several 
local cooperation committees.¹³9
 Another example to be noted is Kentor Gold 
the main project of which is the development 
of the Andash gold-copper site. The company 
has a very developed environmental and so-
cial management scheme.¹⁴0 The company has 
invested in interaction with local populations 
and in community development projects. This 
has been also a necessity since the company 
has faced strong opposition from the local 
people towards its mining plans. By way of an 
example, CSR projects (part of the company’s 
community development programme) to be 
implemented in Kentor’s Andash mine site 
include a Micro-Finance Scheme to assist lo-
cal villagers in sustainable development.¹⁴¹ 
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support would be in order since while differ-
ent community development programmes and 
funds can be efficient mechanisms to prevent 
and mitigate mining conflicts, they may also 
fuel tensions if they have not been set up or 
function properly.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Provide appropriate legislation that inte-
grates assessment of the social impacts of 
mining projects (similar to the EIA pro-
cedure) as a requirement for any mining 
development.
• Establish a legal framework that gives an 
incentive to corporate social responsibil-
ity based on voluntarism.
• Analyze how CSR can contribute to con-
flict mitigation and develop correspond-
ing policies on self-regulation.
In addition, the company has also planned 
to provide a 1 per cent royalty to community 
development projects in the local village, dis-
trict and province.¹⁴² However, despite the at-
tempts of Kentor to “be responsive to and sat-
isfy the locals”, the local residents still oppose 
to the work of the company. 
 As can be seen from the examples above, the 
mining industry active in Kyrgyzstan has in-
creasingly been engaged with self-regulation 
as to the mitigation of the negative social im-
pacts of their mining operations. The trend 
of establishing different social development 
funds has been especially clear. This has large-
ly been an answer to the criticism presented 
by local communities that a larger share of the 
profits that the companies make should ben-
efit the local population. The CSR policies have 
developed rapidly during the last 10-20 years, 
starting from the non-existent Soviet time 
legacy to the current largely civil society–ini-
tiated programmes. The Kyrgyz state has re-
mained mainly silent in the face of these self-
regulatory developments of the mining sector. 
However, perhaps some state regulation and 
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proBlEmS and challEngES
risks of mining activities in Kyrgyzstan
Mining industry enterprises in Kyrgyzstan are 
mainly located in the mountain areas. Since 
these areas are ecologically vulnerable, the im-
pact of mining activities on the environment is 
stronger than with similar enterprises in other 
countries located on the plains.¹⁴³ Generally, 
mining activities cause many kinds of harm, 
actual or potential depending on the case. In 
short, the risks of environmental harm include 
pollution of soil, water (surface and ground 
water) and air; erosion; hazardous chemicals 
(especially mercury) and waste; and loss of 
biological diversity (especially in remote and 
previously undisturbed areas).¹⁴⁴ Further-
more, mining induces, worsens and accelerates 
many processes typical of mountainous areas 
such as landslides, mudflows, slope erosion 
and others and also leads to some dangerous 
anthropogenic processes such as subsidence, 
flooding and pollution.¹⁴⁵ The exacerbated 
processes may also release hazardous sub-
stances to the surroundings with considerable 
harmful impacts.¹⁴6
 On the social side, the most pressing prob-
lems caused by mining are the dependence 
of local people on the revenue generated by 
the mine and the still sometimes prevailing 
hazardous working conditions. The issue of 
(legally) guaranteed benefits or share of the 
profits of the mine to the local authorities and 
population is felt very important in the Kyrgyz 
mining areas. If the local actors are not given 
sufficient consideration in benefit sharing, the 
incentive of these people to develop coopera-
tion with mining companies fades. 
 From a regulatory viewpoint, the interna-
tional Extractive Industries Transparency Ini-
tiative (EITI) has been established to tackle, 
among other issues, the problem of inadequate 
transparency and accountability of mining 
companies. The Initiative aims at improved 
governance of resource revenues in the oil, 
mining and gas sectors. This could lead to bet-
ter management of the resources, thus pro-
moting economic and political stability and 
preventing conflicts.¹⁴⁷ Kyrgyzstan has been 
EITI-compliant since 2001. It is generally con-
sidered that company implementation of EITI 
in Kyrgyzstan is generally strong.¹⁴⁸ The EITI 
is also valued by the civil society, company 
stakeholders and the government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. In general, partly thanks to EITI, the 
dialogue between mining companies and lo-
cal residents has improved. Mining companies 
have also begun to develop community devel-
opment programmes.¹⁴9 Government repre-
sentatives appreciate the initiative for helping 
improve natural resource governance within 
the country.¹⁵0 However, though EITI has 
brought significant benefits to Kyrgyzstan in 
numerous ways, its implementation could still 
be improved. So far, the imperfect legal frame-
work, absence of a clear auditing mechanism, 
and poor awareness of local communities 
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further factor that the mining industry has to 
take into account when making investments in 
the country. The latter issue is, however, most 
easily controllable by the state government.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Ensure well-regulated and fair benefit 
sharing, working conditions, and social 
development to enable good cooperation 
between the mining company and the lo-
cal community.
• Implement a sound legal basis for social 
and environmental management before, 
during and after mining activities are 
carried out.
through mass media about the Initiative have 
been hampering EITI implementation in the 
country.¹⁵¹
 For the industry and companies, mining in 
Kyrgyzstan always involves political risks in 
addition to the potential environmental and 
social grievances. The past has shown that the 
government policy may change quite rapidly. 
The government may introduce measures that 
discourage foreign investment by implement-
ing unforeseen restrictions or requirements; 
even nationalization of mining industries has 
sometimes been mentioned even though the 
official line has been strongly against such de-
velopments.¹⁵²
 Overall, the mining sector in Kyrgyzstan 
suffers from bad legacy and high tensions 
among different stakeholders. The negative 
social and environmental legacy of the sector 
can be considered a major obstacle to building 
trust and moving forward. Political risks are a 
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legacy of tailings
There are differences in the available infor-
mation, but according to the data of 2009, 
Kyrgyzstan had 92 locations where toxic and 
radioactive mining waste had accumulated, 
totaling 250 million cubic meters.¹⁵³ Many of 
the sites are in a dangerous condition, which 
creates a risk of a leak of hazardous or even 
radioactive material into the river system and 
further to neighbouring countries.¹⁵⁴ There is 
some national regulation in Kyrgyzstan in this 
respect, but, overall, there is no clear distri-
bution of duties in radioactive waste manage-
ment between existing governmental struc-
tures that have competence in this area.
 All is very well if there is legislation in place 
on mine closure and environmental and social 
rehabilitation, and it is effectively executed. 
However, what to do with degraded, aban-
doned mining sites? They often form a great 
environmental and health risk for local com-
munities and sometimes even to the environ-
ment and people in neighbouring countries. 
The past misbehavior within the mining sec-
tor also forms a great source of discontent and 
suspicion among local communities towards 
new mining projects.
 The first things to find out are whether the 
former owner of the operation or the current 
owner of the land can be identified and brought 
to bear responsibility. Further, it needs to be 
examined whether laws were broken when the 
mine was still in operation or had just been 
closed. Often, however, the mine operator or 
the owner of the land (if it is even privately 
owned to begin with) cannot be brought to 
bear responsibility. 
 In the past, there were no requirements for 
mine closure planning or guarantees of envi-
ronmental rehabilitation. In these cases, re-
medial action must be taken by the state, often 
with the assistance of different NGOs and in-
ternational organizations. When such projects 
are carried out, the actions should be carefully 
planned since the risks and costs are high. The 
phases of action include, first, identification 
of the sites, then assessing their risks, deter-
mining what actions would be needed and how 
much they would cost. Finally, funding mecha-
nisms should be developed at the national and 
international levels. Given the starting point 
that not all sites requiring rehabilitation can 
be remedied anyway, priority should be given 
to sites where remedial action will offer a clear 
payoff in improved public health and safety, 
more usable water supplies, or other demon-
strable benefits, such as protection of biodiver-
sity. Another priority is sites with significant 
abandoned mine legacy problems, and those 
with particularly pressing social legacies of 
mining communities.¹⁵⁵
 In Kyrgyzstan, there are, unfortunately, 
numerous abandoned mining sites that have 
not been properly closed, not to mention en-
vironmentally rehabilitated. These sites are 
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radioactive waste from the Soviet era is also 
a considerable challenge to Kyrgyz economic, 
social and political development and also to 
the neighboring countries. The tailings, a leg-
acy of years of inadequate safety measures in 
the mining sector, are regarded as presenting 
the highest risks to environmental safety and 
human health in Kyrgyzstan.¹⁵⁸ It has been 
estimated that if immediate action is not tak-
en, it will only be a matter of time before soil 
erosion, landslides, flooding or earthquakes 
will destroy one or more of the uranium tailing 
dams, with the possible consequence of caus-
ing a national and regional catastrophe with 
radioactive waste being released into the air 
and/or nearby rivers or lakes.¹⁵9 
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Develop a rehabilitation strategy that in-
cludes systematic assessment, prioritiza-
tion and remediation of environmental 
threats at each orphaned and abandoned 
mine site.
• Integrate mine closure planning and re-
mediation in mining agreements to pre-
vent mining legacies in the future and 
secure funding via environmental bonds 
created during the economic phase of the 
mining operations.
the legacy of the former Soviet Union, which 
makes their proper treatment very challeng-
ing. Until recent years, these sites have mainly 
been ignored by the authorities. Formally, the 
Ministry of Emergencies is responsible for the 
issue of abandoned mining sites. According to 
the old 1991 law on environmental protection, 
residual pollution or damage to the environ-
ment caused before 1992 is considered to be 
the responsibility of the state. However, due to 
lack of funding and institutional methods for 
determining the owners’ liability for the urani-
um production facilities and radioactive waste 
storage facilities, not much concrete has been 
done to address the problems of abandoned 
mining sites.¹⁵6
 In recent years, former mining sites have 
been under review and in some cases under 
rehabilitation efforts with the assistance of 
international finance and development organi-
zations. Much more effort is, however, needed 
to properly deal with the issue. Sometimes a 
mining company discovers an interesting de-
posit in the area of an abandoned mining site. 
In these cases, an environmental audit will be 
conducted which will distinguish between the 
legacy of the past and the impacts of the new 
project (the company shall be responsible only 
for the latter).¹⁵⁷
 The fate of tailings dumps of radioactive 
waste located at closed uranium mining and 
processing sites is a serious issue in Kyrgyzstan 
and a severe regulatory problem for the coun-
try and the broader region. The disposal of 
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Special Question: mining in protected areas
Mining in or near protected areas is a sensitive 
issue. The pressure to allow mining activities in 
protected areas is often hard as mining would 
bring revenue to the state and also to a vary-
ing extent to the specific area. Furthermore, 
mining companies generally say that they rec-
ognize the value of biodiversity and the need 
to protect valuable areas. However, they point 
out that the demand for minerals is increasing. 
In addition, it is argued that new technologies 
reduce negative impacts of mining on the envi-
ronment.¹60 It is true that companies may use 
advanced technology and follow best practices, 
but accidents may always happen, and the con-
sequences in or near a highly valuable protect-
ed area can be serious. In Kyrgyzstan, mining 
companies have in many cases not been very 
successful in convincing local communities 
of the safety of their operations and of the ef-
fectiveness of the environmental protection 
measures that companies (routinely or accord-
ing to tailored site-specific processes) take. In 
fact, much of the public opposition towards 
new mining projects in Kyrgyzstan stems from 
suspicions by local communities that the min-
ing companies will not take adequate meas-
ures to protect the vulnerable environment in 
and around mining sites.
 To resolve the issue, criteria should be es-
tablished and consultations organized before 
a decision is made whether to take a protected 
area into mining use. Efforts to this end have 
been taken at the international level, although 
the outcomes have been rather soft. The In-
ternational Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) has issued a recommendation that 
“IUCN’s State members prohibit by law, all ex-
ploration and extraction of mineral resources 
in protected areas corresponding to IUCN 
Protected Area Management Categories I to 
IV”.¹6¹ At the international company level, the 
members of the International Council on Min-
ing and Metals have made a commitment not 
to mine in or near World Heritage Sites.¹6²
 In Kyrgyz legislation, the Law on Special 
Protected Natural Areas¹6³ regulates nature 
protection areas. Generally, existing and well-
established nature reserves are strongly pro-
tected and mining is not allowed in them. It is 
specifically prescribed that any economic ac-
tivity is prohibited in reserved areas of the first 
category.¹6⁴ However, the borders of protected 
areas are not always clear. Moreover, mining 
(or at least exploration activities) may be al-
lowed in more softly protected areas (e.g., so-
called buffer-zones around more strictly pro-
tected areas).¹6⁵ These kinds of “border cases” 
tend to cause conflicts and state authorities 
must be consistent in their policies in order to 
lessen tensions.
 Inconsistent actions of the Kyrgyz Govern-
ment in this respect lead to inevitable colli-
sions. In 2009, two land sites (Ak-tyuz and 
Oktorkoy) adjacent to industrial areas were 
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 activities thereafter as any activity that might 
affect the safety of these sanctuaries, reserves 
and natural monuments is prohibited. The 
practical protection of such areas is, however, 
difficult as information on them is lacking. 
Furthermore, reporting of the found historical 
mining sites may be ignored (in principle, sub-
soil users are required to discontinue works 
at the land plot and inform the State Agency 
for Geology and Mineral Resources if they dis-
cover rare geological and mineralogical forma-
tions, meteorites, paleontological, archaeolog-
ical and other objects of scientific or cultural 
value) or expertise on assessing and preserv-
ing them is lacking.¹⁷¹ The final decision on 
protected geological sites rests with the Min-
ing Agency.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Establish consistent criteria and consul-
tation procedures for mining operations 
in protected areas. 
• Ensure that these criteria cover all rel-
evant areas including environmental, 
geological and mineralogical formations, 
meteorites, paleontological, archaeologi-
cal and other objects of scientific or cul-
tural value. 
• Ensure relevant expertise in all areas 
concerning a protected area to be in-
cluded in the information gathering and 
decision-making process.
put outside of the boundaries of an established 
nature park (Keminskiy).¹66 The decision was 
justified by the aim to “attract investments 
into the mining sector and development of 
geologic exploration and mining works”. Con-
sequently, the sites were passed to the mining 
companies for prospection and design of min-
ing works. Since then, geological exploration 
was completed and three mining areas were 
prepared in Ak-Tyuz village. However, the new 
Kyrgyz government cancelled the previous 
resolution in February 2012, and the industrial 
sites were returned to the park. This made the 
investments that the mining companies had 
made in the area worthless, an outcome that 
was naturally met with deep frustration by the 
companies.¹6⁷ Consequently, one of the min-
ing companies has challenged this decision of 
the government in court. 
 A recent report has alleged that the Kumtor 
mining licence area has spread to the area of 
the adjacent Sarychat-Eertash nature reserve. 
A part of the reserve has been assigned as 
part of the new concessions area of the mine.
In addition, the Kumtor Operating Company 
has a licence for prospecting areas that are in 
the buffer zone of this nature reserve. It has 
been pointed out that these acts are against the 
Kyrgyz regulations on environmental protec-
tion.¹6⁸ As a minimum, the situation should be 
ameliorated by urgently conducting an envi-
ronmental impact assessment in the areas.¹69
 According to the Law on Subsoil, paleon-
tological objects and other subsoil portions 
of special scientific or cultural value may be 
declared geological sanctuaries or reserves, 
or natural or cultural monuments.¹⁷0 It is 
clear that such areas are not open to mining 
Problems and Challenges
36
poor governance
In the early years of independence, Kyrgyzstan 
was often described an “island of democ-
racy”¹⁷² or the “democratic showcase of the 
former Soviet Union”¹⁷³ as the country was 
regarded as an avant-garde among Central 
Asian states in both democratic and economic 
reforms. However, the democratic develop-
ment has actually been quite slow in many 
fields as shown in weaknesses of transparency 
and government. The system has been charac-
terized to a large extent by political and group 
interests, which are not conducive to develop-
ing a climate of transparency.¹⁷⁴
 Many restrictions have been removed, but 
democratic principles still need more effective 
implementation in the country. Corruption 
continues to be one of the major challenges. 
The corruption perception index (published 
by Transparency International) ranked Kyr-
gyzstan 164th out of 178 countries surveyed 
in 2010.¹⁷⁵ Corruption has been an unfor-
tunate feature also in the mining sector of 
Kyrgyzstan. For instance, there have been al-
legations against members of the presidential 
family and concerns over why the country 
appeared to benefit so little from its gold ex-
ports.¹⁷6 The Kyrgyz government has publicly 
denounced corruption and implemented some 
steps to counter the problem, but positive re-
sults have sometimes been slow in coming.¹⁷⁷ 
Indeed, it has been argued that the trend in 
the country in the last few years has been an 
increase rather than a reduction in corrup-
tion.¹⁷⁸
 Despite some structural reforms, the cen-
tral and local governments in Kyrgyzstan still 
suffer from weaknesses of governance and re-
sources in many areas. More generally, lack of 
strategic economic and social planning ham-
per the development of the country. Moreover, 
heavy bureaucracy, together with a high cor-
ruption rate, slows down economic activity 
considerably.¹⁷9 Consequently, Kyrgyzstan‘s 
current governance system has been assessed 
to indicate significant accountability and legit-
imacy problems, partly inherited from the pre-
vious regime and sustained by economically 
and administratively detrimental practices.¹⁸0
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Enforcement challenges
It is not sufficient that regulation exists; the 
regulated actors must also comply with it. Ef-
fective implementation of regulation requires 
knowledge and institutional capacity from the 
regulator.¹⁸¹ The laws have to be supplement-
ed by lower level and more detailed regulation: 
by-laws, resolutions, decisions and directives. 
Only through them can an implementation gap 
be avoided, provided that the implementation 
and enforcement are effective.
 Studies conducted on the Kyrgyz environ-
mental regulation have identified the follow-
ing reasons to nourish non-compliance with 
the regulation: the slow pace of governance 
and economic reforms; the complicated le-
gal framework and poor economic situation; 
society’s failure to believe in fair regulation; 
and the erosion of the rule of the law.¹⁸² Cor-
respondingly, found reasons for weak enforce-
ment included enforcement agencies’ limited 
powers and scarce financial and human re-
sources, confrontational relations with the 
regulated community due to lack of dialogue 
between stakeholders, low understanding 
of compliance problems, unfeasible regula-
tory requirements, and outdated instruments 
of compliance assurance and promotion.¹⁸³ 
These same issues are to be found also in the 
field of mining-related regulation in the coun-
try. Some of the challenges are related to au-
thorities’ resource problems, some are of ad-
ministrative or institutional nature, while 
others derive from poor instrument or strategy 
choice.
 The main responsibility for implementing 
and enforcing mining regulation in Kyrgyzstan 
rests on the State Agency for Geology and Min-
eral Resources. The State Inspection on Envi-
ronmental and Technical Safety at the Gov-
ernment of the Kyrgyz Republic is the general 
enforcement authority for environmental laws 
and regulations. The administrative arrange-
ments for enforcement easily become complex 
because of unclear legislation, a high level of 
corruption and the fact that the division of re-
sponsibilities among different government de-
partments and among national, provincial and 
local levels of government is seldom straight-
forward. This situation is prone to give rise to 
different types of conflicts among the mining 
industry and various stakeholders.
 It has become clear that the status and re-
sources of enforcement authorities should be 
strengthened in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to 
providing sufficient resources, it should be 
ensured that the enforcement authorities act 
from the right motive: out of a concern to en-
sure fair implementation and effectiveness of 
the regulation, not for the purpose of raising 
revenue for the government.¹⁸⁴
 Monitoring of mining activities (including 
their environmental impacts) is the respon-
sibility of the State Agency for Geology and 
Mineral Resources. The Agency is to conduct 
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regular checks of companies’ compliance with 
their mining licences and licence agreements. 
Monitoring is done to cover both the mining 
project design and actual mining operations. If 
a company delivers incomplete reports, sanc-
tions may follow. A decision to stop the mining 
operations may be issued if there is a failure to 
report by a company.¹⁸⁵
 Monitoring activities face, however, the 
risk of corruption in the country. Authorities 
have quite broad discretion to decide whether 
a company’s reporting is sufficient or not.¹⁸6 
Furthermore, authorities often face difficul-
ties in getting operational and reliable infor-
mation on the actions of mining companies 
supposed to be subject to monitoring.¹⁸⁷ This 
state of affairs partly originates from restric-
tions to access industrial sites.¹⁸⁸ It is under-
standable that the sites need to restrict visitors 
from entering, but this should not be applied 
to authorities who are conducting their legiti-
mate monitoring tasks. Usually, inspection 
visits are allowed if arranged beforehand with 
the management of a mining site.¹⁸9 This is 
general practice in most countries.
 Monitoring is a function where the exper-
tise and capacity of the Kyrgyz civil society 
and non-governmental organizations could be 
taken into much more active use. Government 
authorities often have excessive reservations 
towards the engagement of civil society in en-
vironmental monitoring; however, assistance 
could often be welcomed as more active moni-
toring is seldom a bad thing. Interestingly, the 
Law on Environmental Protection establishes 
the right of public associations to participate 
in inspections conducted to examine compli-
ance with environmental legislation.¹90 This 
opportunity should be more effectively used 
by civil society.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Strengthen the role of civil society in 
the monitoring of mining activities to 
increase efficiency and lower the risk of 
corruption.
• Strengthen the status and resources of 
enforcement authorities and shift their 
focus on implementation and effective-
ness of the regulation, not for the purpose 
of raising revenue for the government.
Mining Regulation in the Kyrgyz Republic
39
Kyrgyz mining policy: attracting investment 
– at the cost of Sustainability and Stability?
Government’s role in pursuing mining and 
minerals development includes establishing 
an institutional and administrative frame-
work for gaining access to mineral resources, 
setting up effective and efficient legal systems, 
levying appropriate charges, and designing a 
regulatory system to prevent and control en-
vironmental impacts from mining activities – 
without forgetting appropriate handling of po-
tential and actual social issues.¹9¹ Thus, there 
are numerous issues that the government has 
to resolve, many systems to set up and impacts 
to assess or foresee before it can expect an ac-
tive mineral industry in the country.
 In developing their mining policies, govern-
ments have to seek a balance between attract-
ing investors and ensuring the environmental 
and social sustainability of mining. The legal 
framework is one of the factors that constitute 
the overall investment regime that investors 
take into account when making their invest-
ment decisions. Often, in practice, countries 
are competing to attract (foreign) private sec-
tor capital for mineral exploration and devel-
opment: all want to have an attractive mining 
investment regime. Consequently, many coun-
tries have in this race liberalized their mining 
codes by strengthening private mining rights 
and security of tenure, and by minimizing 
state intervention.¹9²
 The officially proclaimed policy of the 
 Kyrgyz government is to create a favorable 
environment for investments and to develop 
the mining sector of the economy. The “fun-
damental mission” is to “identify stimulating, 
legal and institutional basis and to provide its 
application” for the development of the mining 
sector.¹9³ For necessary reasons (high capital 
intensity of mining projects and scarcity of 
domestic financial resources), the policy has 
been focusing on active attraction of foreign 
investments.¹9⁴ The country has taken up an 
ambitious plan to review and liberalize the 
regulatory basis and requirements for foreign 
investments in the mining sector. The state has 
announced that it will replace its excessive ad-
ministrative control functions with arguably 
more effective market (economic) regulations. 
 Review efforts to remove impediments to 
foreign direct investment in the mining sector 
in Kyrgyzstan have been truly needed. Identi-
fied obstacles to foreign investments include 
administrative bureaucracy (including exces-
sive intervention of control agencies), corrup-
tion, lack of legal stability (including incon-
sistent implementation and interpretation of 
laws), lack of regional cooperation, security 
concerns and insufficient institutional capac-
ity of governmental agencies.¹9⁵
 The regulatory framework of Kyrgyzstan 
could be described as one that is in many parts 
purposefully built to attract foreign invest-
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competitive. This has also strengthened ad-
ministrative interference in the mining busi-
ness. While it is important to continuously seek 
to attract investments and develop the mining 
industry, frequent changes in the regulatory 
environment in fact deter investments to some 
extent. Due to the fluctuating policy, mining 
companies have reportedly faced the challenge 
of understanding what the right standards are 
and what is the right level of investment in so-
cial and environmental performance.¹99 The 
uncertainties tend to make mining companies 
very careful in their investment decisions, 
which can lead to under-performance with re-
gard to their original business plans, including 
social and environmental precautions and pro-
jects taken at the mining sites.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Implement a life-cycle approach for min-
ing regulation to ensure the mining poli-
cy covers all relevant aspects before, dur-
ing and after mineral extraction. 
• Ensure stability or predictability of legal 
requirements to provide a reliable invest-
ment framework for mining companies.
ments. The interests of the regulated busi-
ness community are increasingly taken into 
account within the lawmaking process and 
the regulatory requirements are not anymore 
“parachuted” on the industry.¹96 The regu-
lated community welcomes this kind of devel-
opment while critics may point out that state 
regulation should serve the public interest. In 
general, Kyrgyzstan has a relatively open and 
liberal policy towards foreign investment.¹9⁷ 
However, many investors have in recent years 
become involved in disputes over licensing, 
registration, and enforcement of contracts. 
Thus, the details of the system need improve-
ment. Indeed, a World Bank study concluded 
in 2009 stated that Kyrgyzstan has not man-
aged very well the transition into revitalizing 
its mining sector following an economic col-
lapse and the institution of a new Constitution 
(amended several times in 2000s) and body of 
laws. The study assessed that the new laws un-
der consideration would create an even worse 
environment for mining investment.¹9⁸
 From any perspective, a life-cycle approach 
(from planning to operation to closure) is im-
portant in the regulation concerning mining. 
Another crucial aspect is at least some kind 
of stability or predictability of legal require-
ments. In Kyrgyzstan, the mining policies have 
been restructured and updated many times, 
especially in an effort to become globally more 
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Establishing and especially effectively im-
plementing responsible mining regulation 
and policy is very challenging in Kyrgyzstan. 
Difficulties at the societal level – widespread 
corruption, poor economic conditions, and a 
low level of public environmental awareness 
– sometimes severely hamper effective natu-
ral resources governance in the country. Add 
to that frequent changes in government struc-
tures and policies, the vulnerable environmen-
tal conditions and public opposition to new 
mining projects, and the situation is revealed 
in all its main complexities.
 Overall, the current policymaking situation 
in the mining sector in Kyrgyzstan is somewhat 
confusing. It has been the general government 
line that the investment attractiveness of the 
country should be improved, also with regard 
to the mining sector. A number of policy deci-
sions have been taken in this respect, yet the 
actions have been rather haphazard and even 
confusing. Frequent changes in the country’s 
leadership and governance structures have 
caused uncertainty and a lack of predictability 
for mining policy. It has been pointed out that 
the mining industry has suffered from a series 
of strong actions by the Kyrgyz government 
to limit their freedom of action and business 
opportunities; these include the suspension of 
the issuance of licences and their cancellation; 
closing access to geological information funds; 
and the fact that the established inter-agency 
licensing commission does not have mining 
professionals as members.²00 
 Nevertheless, it seems that the relevant 
agencies and actors should be more aware of 
each other’s planned and ongoing actions, and 
that they should seek cooperation and joint 
ventures in the realization of environmen-
tal and natural resources management in the 
country. In the same vein, better coordina-
tion between the central government and the 
oblasts would be beneficial. It would ensure 
that the local requirements for mining activi-
ties would be in line with the government re-
quirements. In addition, a coordinated policy 
would give the mining companies that come to 
Kyrgyzstan a good understanding of what they 
can expect both from the central government 
and local authorities. These issues should not 
be a question of resources as much as many 
other policy development efforts.
 In addition to improving the administrative 
and regulatory framework for mining, Kyr-
gyzstan should actively seek to resolve con-
flicts within the sector. Not only the relations 
between authorities and mining companies 
but even more so between the mining indus-
try and local people need to be improved and 
cherished. 
 It is not sufficient that the government con-
centrates on establishing feasible economic 
and administrative conditions for the mining 
industry in the country, but the relevant social 
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and environmental aspects also need urgent 
attention. These are also tightly intertwined 
issues since, for instance, public concerns over 
the environmental problems caused by min-
ing activities give rise to protests and social 
unrest in the country. The policymakers face a 
big challenge in developing Kyrgyzstan’s min-
ing policy environment as they have to balance 
between different parties and their interests, 
and between the economic, social and envi-
ronmental demands in pursuing sustainable 
development for the country. 
 It has been stated that a country willing to 
attract private investors in the mining sector 
needs to develop policies in four key areas.²0¹ 
First, it needs to establish sound mining and 
investment codes with clear rules and guaran-
tees regarding exploration and mining rights. 
Kyrgyzstan has done quite well in this respect. 
However, ineffective implementation of the 
legislation and unpredictable moves by the 
government have made the mining industry 
somewhat cautious when planning new invest-
ments in Kyrgyzstan. The mining industry has 
unfortunately learned on several occasions 
that the country’s legislation does not provide 
sufficient guarantees for investment decisions.
 Second, governments must assure compa-
nies that they will have the right to mine fol-
lowing successful exploration, and that they 
will be permitted to transfer or trade explora-
tion or mining licences subject to explicit cri-
teria. In the light of these criteria, Kyrgyzstan 
appears, again, relatively good at least on pa-
per. Mining licences are usually granted, al-
though the process sometimes appears quite 
cumbersome.
 Third, governments need to enact fiscal re-
gimes that are competitive with and compa-
rable to those in other mining countries. This 
aspect has been taken care of to some extent 
in the Kyrgyz Republic. Changes have been in-
troduced to the tax regime in recent years, and 
nowadays Kyrgyzstan is usually considered as 
a relatively attractive country in this regard. In 
addition to the formal fiscal regime, the Kum-
tor example shows that special mining agree-
ments may at least potentially include provi-
sions on favorable tax treatment.
 Finally, governmental institutions, which 
supervise and regulate the sector, should be 
capable of performing their duties in a profes-
sional, fair, and transparent manner. This is an 
area where the Kyrgyz Republic has the most 
room to improve its performance. The division 
of responsibilities among authorities is not al-
ways very clear, they remain financially under-
resourced and corruption is still a problem at 
all levels of governance.²0²
 The policy-makers must effectively work 
towards realizing the principles of good gov-
ernance, coordinate in the development of the 
country’s natural resources policy and ensure 
that transparency, coherence and sustain-
ability are the key features of any new pro-
posal. Transparency of regulation should be 
improved by possibilities for more effective 
public participation and monitoring. The latter 
aspect has seen some progress recently: public 
oversight boards have begun monitoring gov-
ernment agencies’ expenditures, distribution 
of licences and conduct of tenders. In addition, 
the government has audited more than 20 
mining enterprises.²0³ The findings of these 
audits have been made known to the public.²0⁴ 
The government has also introduced an initia-
tive to engage public opinion, NGOs and the 
media in discussing innovations in the min-
ing industry.²0⁵ These steps of progress have 
arguably moved Kyrgyzstan far ahead of the 
other Commonwealth of Independent States 
member states in terms of mining transpar-
ency.²06 The progress is partly due to the EITI 
programme that requires increasing transpar-
ency in the mining policy of the country. As a 
next step of the EITI, local governments will 
be required to report to the public on their al-
location of mining revenues.²0⁷
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 It is clear that all actors need to improve 
their performance. In addition to the govern-
ment level, the mining industry can improve 
its performance and pay greater attention to 
achieving the goal of responsible mining in 
Kyrgyzstan. A key aspect is going beyond the 
legal requirements, to see real effort to protect 
the environment from harmful impacts and to 
engage with local people, providing accurate 
information and social benefits to the affected 
population.
 Finally, the Kyrgyz people could do more in 
terms of acquiring information and participat-
ing in mining development projects. Authori-
ties should listen to the public if they present 
their comments in an appropriate way (in pub-
lic hearing meetings instead of unlawful riots, 
for instance). It is the duty of the government 
to enable such participation methods.
 The Kyrgyz Republic has invested in improv-
ing its regulatory and business environment, 
and the global trend of increasing prices of raw 
materials has also attracted mining companies 
to seek business opportunities in this mineral-
rich Central Asian state. It appears, however, 
that the government still has considerable 
work to do in the practical implementation of 
the reforms and in the general improvement 
of its natural resource governance. With suffi-
cient resources and (political) will, Kyrgyzstan 
can rise to be one of the top responsible mining 
nations in the world.
Recommendations 
foR decision-makeRs:
• Improve coordination between the agen-
cies and between central and local gov-
ernment to pursue joint ventures in the 
realization of environmental and natural 
resources management.
• Adopt a strategy for active conflict reso-
lution between authorities, mining com-
panies and local communities. 
• Establish and implement a sound mining 
code with clear rules and guarantees re-
garding exploration and mining rights.
• Provide assurance to serious investors 
that they will have the right to mine fol-
lowing successful exploration, and that 
they will be permitted to transfer or trade 
exploration or mining licences subject to 
explicit criteria.
• Enact fiscal regimes that are competitive 
with and comparable to those in other 
mining countries.
• Improve transparency at all levels of de-
cision-making by strengthening public 
participation and monitoring.
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